Deradicalization and Boko Haram: An Appraisal of Operation Safe Corridor

Solomon Timothy Anjide\textsuperscript{a}, Saliu Achile Momoh\textsuperscript{b*}

\textsuperscript{a,b}Department of Defence, Security and International Studies National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Plateau State, Nigeria

\textsuperscript{a}Email: stanjide@yahoo.com

\textsuperscript{b}Email: saliumomoh84@yahoo.com

Abstract

For a successful counter-terrorism (CT) campaign, scholars and conflict managers emphasize a combination of soft and hard approaches. While the hard approach is effective in weakening terrorist’s military capabilities, the soft strategy such as negotiations, deradicalization, disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration are employed to address the underlying issues that fuel terrorism for peace and stability. In 2016, the Nigerian government established Operation Safe Corridor (OSC), as part of the soft approach of Nigeria’s national CT strategy. The OSC is targeted toward deradicalizing and screening Boko Haram (BH) defectors and victims who are at risk. The programme is also a response to local and international concerns on Nigeria to reduce the disproportional use of force and the blowback effects. OSC is criticised for been counter-productive. This study examines the level of implementation of the OSC as well as its outcome. The study discovered that the OSC tends to mix BH defectors and released BH captives for screening, this provided opportunity for further radicalisation. Moreover, the operationalisation of the programme generates issues of human rights and inadequate management which results to donor dissatisfaction and inadequate public confidence on the effectiveness of the programme. The public confidence deficit has made the reintegration of graduate internees a herculean task especially at the community level. This study recommends that for OSC to be effective, the Nigerian government should expand its major focus on speedy disengagement of violent extremists from violence. There is also a need to review the methodology of the programme as well as the exiting strategy of graduate internees from the programme. To achieve the aim of the study, broad sources of data is employed including Key Informant Interviews (KII), peer-reviewed journals, official documents and reports, as well as media sources.

Keywords: Boko Haram; Deradicalization; Operation Safe Corridor.

* Corresponding author.
1. Introduction

Ending the Boko Haram (BH) campaign of violence across Northeast Nigeria remains a great challenge to Nigeria and the neighbouring countries of Chad, Cameroon and Niger in the Sahel region [1]. BH have killed about 350,000 people since 2009, displaced over 3 million persons, and exposed about 5.6 million individuals have been exposed to emergency food aid [2,3]. Since the BH uprising and its evolution into a full-blown terrorist group, the Nigerian government has employed different CT measures to address the BH threat [1]. The initial military approach was criticised for its counter-productiveness, human rights violations and the resultant recruitment of aggrieved individuals into the BH group [4]. Therefore, with the introduction of NACTEST (National Counter-terrorism Strategy) 2014, the Nigerian government introduced a soft approach to addressing the BH violence [5]. NACTEST 2014 is the first CT strategy to be introduced by the Nigerian State, it was initiated because of the surge in BH violence [6]. Moreover, NACTEST has been revised in 2016 and it is expected to be revised periodically to address the ever-changing nature of terrorist tactics. One of the major highlights of the soft approach to ending terrorism and BH violence is deradicalization. The Nigerian government introduced two major deradicalization programmes namely; Prison based deradicalization and Operation Safe Corridor.

Operation Safe Corridor was initiated in 2016 by the Nigerian government with the aim of receiving voluntary defectors from Different BH factions [7]. The Nigerian government developed Operation Safe Corridor to receive voluntary defectors from Boko Haram factions as part of a nationwide plan to degrade insurgent activities in the country's north east region. OSC is the result of several years of discussions within the Nigerian government about how to encourage voluntary defections from Boko Haram. As early as 2013, four years into the insurgency, the authorities started to recognize that a military response alone would be insufficient to dismantle the group. [8]. Therefore, OSC can be considered a Nigerian-developed program for offering recruits with a voluntary way out of Boko Haram.

The program’s core target group is low-level jihadist recruits who perform combatant and/or non-combatant roles and are important to the daily functioning of Boko Haram’s two main factions – Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad, or JAS) and Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). [9]. OSC obviously has great potentials; its very existence encourages Boko Haram recruits to leave a struggle that many of them have come to believe is futile and worthless. But since OSC’s commencement in May 2016. Academics and conflict experts are sceptical regarding the success of the programme. The criticisms and reservations are premised on the ambiguity of critical issues such as the modalities for the implementation of the programme, important issues such as where defecting Boko Haram members will be reintegrated, and frustrations of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and other victims affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. Furthermore, donors and officials had hoped the programme would be able to facilitate the defections of thousands of militants from the target population, unfortunately, it has not been the case. Even among the few hundreds of individuals who have gone through or are currently participating in the programme, many are not from the expected target population, rather, they are civilians who threw off Boko Haram’s yoke and who, after detention by security forces, were mistakenly categorised as militants and channelled into Safe Corridor [10].
This study, seeks to appraise the OSC programme through the application of both primary and secondary data. The paper attempts to identify the challenges and prospects of the programme with the aim of recommending ways to facilitate the optimal operationalisation of the programme. This paper is divided into six sections namely: methodology debates on deradicalization, historical background of OSC, methods of operationalising the OSC, factors influencing OSC, lessons, recommendation and, conclusion.

2. Methodology

This study is an exploratory research that employs a case study approach encompassing both primary and secondary methods. The secondary sources employed includes published sources such as peer-reviewed journals, official reports and documents and media sources. The primary data was derived from KII and personal observations. The interview participants include four security operatives who have been at the theater of operation in the North-east, Nigeria and, a senior Borno State government official. This study like other studies comes with some limitations, especially from the interview participants. The identity of interview participants is kept anonymous because of the security implications involved and their desire to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the issue being discussed. Moreover, some of the participants were unwilling to divulge some information needed for the study. Secondary sources including journals, reports and media sources were included to address the limitation.

3. Debates on Deradicalization

Previous studies have attempted to define, conceptualise and contextualise deradicalization. In terms of definition, various scholars suggest various definitions. The author in [11] sees deradicalization as a process in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals while moving towards an acceptance of gradual, political and economic changes within a pluralistic context. The scholar in [12] conceives de-radicalization as a formal or informal approach aimed at reducing commitment to an extremist viewpoint that has led or could lead to violent action. While, the author in [13] describes the de-radicalization programme as containing particular methods, such as mentoring, vocational training or psychological counselling.

The scholars in [14] define deradicalization as “the process of changing an individual’s belief system, rejecting the extremist ideology and embracing mainstream values.” Deradicalization therefore suggest that the individual has dismissed the ideological belief system and, in this way, never again holds fast to the belief system that describe a specific gathering. Given that radicalisation is frequently framed as a gradual and complex process of escalation, this article views de-radicalisation as a complex process of broad attitudinal change that, by definition, constitutes de-radicalisation regardless of whether it has reached its ostensible ‘end state’ of ideological abandonment.

Aside the different arguments about the definition of deradicalization, one of the most debated area within the literature of deradicalization is on the issue of conflating deradicalization and disengagement and the practice of both concepts. Mainstream scholars on deradicalization tend to create a conceptual differentiation between
disengagement and deradicalization in which disengagement is understood to mean a behavioural change [15, 16]. In disengagement, the individual desists from or reduces their use of violence. On the other hand, deradicalization aims at both behavioural and cognitive change. Disengagement refers to the process of moving a person away from their extreme group’s activities, without necessarily deradicalizing that person or changing their views. While deradicalization suggests the individual has dismissed the ideological conviction framework and hence never again hold fast to the philosophies that describe a specific group. On this basis, the research argues that deradicalization and disengagement describe processes whereby individuals or groups discontinue their participation in organized violence and/or terrorism. While deradicalization aims for fundamental changes in ideology and attitudes, disengagement focuses on enabling behavioural alteration in the context of the denunciation of violence. As such, deradicalization ought to be seen as different from disengagement since it recommends a change in the person’s world view. Along these lines, deradicalization includes a change in conviction, while disengagement is defined as change in behaviour.

From the foregoing, while deradicalization is the process of moderating one’s beliefs, disengagement is simply the process of changing one’s behaviour by refraining from violence and withdrawing from a radical organization. The author in [17] notes that disengagement can be the product of psychological factors (for example, disillusionment) or physical factors (most notably, imprisonment). He further argues that disengaging from a terrorist organization does not necessarily entail leaving the group; rather, a person disengages from terrorism by not executing violent attacks, even if that person remains affiliated with the radical organization. Corroborating this argument, the author in [18] notes that disengaged terrorists may not be deradicalized or repentant at all. Oftentimes, physical disengagement may not result in any concomitant change or reduction in ideological support.

4. Historical Background of Operation Safe the Corridor

The Federal government of Nigeria, through the Defence Headquarters inaugurated Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) in 2016. The programme's aim is to rehabilitate repentant Boko Haram militants and reintegrate them back into their respective communities as productive law-abiding citizens. The defecting members will acquire vocations, training, access de-radicalisation and civics programme to become useful members of their society upon release from the programme. The Nigerian deradicalization programme emerged because of the consistent outcry for alternative approach to the dominant military-based CT approach applied by the Nigerian State over the last decade [19].

The excessive use of force contributed to the radicalization of moderates and the generation of more BH sympathisers [20]. Nigeria had been under severe international pressure to address suspected human rights issues arising from CT operations such as arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, extrajudicial and indiscriminate killings, and torture [21]. Additionally, Nigeria’s approach to ending terrorism was complex because of BH’s adoption of an asymmetrical warfare and the use of extremist propaganda against the Nigerian State. Therefore, the deradicalization and Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE) came as a response to these dynamics. Furthermore, some of the factors that precipitated the soft approach dates back to 2013 when the elites from Northern Nigeria exerted great pressure on the Federal Government of Nigeria for a political approach to address the structural
factors of socio-economic inequality and political alienation that motivate the BH violence [22, 19]. The rallying call engineered the establishment of the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in Northern Nigeria in 2013 which had the mandate to engage leaders of Boko Haram and to develop a framework for amnesty and disarmament of members of the group [23]. The initiative was unsuccessful because of BH’s refusal to accept the amnesty deal. However, the FGN emplaced a CVE mechanism under the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA), code-named National Security Corridor not just to confront the BH growing recruitment and mobilization but to rehabilitate BH defectors. The programme categorised radicals into; low-risk, medium-risk and high-risk individuals. Disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration methods were applied to the low-risk and medium-risk individuals, while the high-risk individuals were subjected for prosecution [24]. Between 2014 and 2016 the programme was eclipsed by assiduous military action against BH as Nigeria experienced an upsurge in the group’s campaign of violence. Regardless of the challenge within that period, in 2015, 22 women and girls went through rehabilitation process after voluntarily surrendering, 305 victims of the terrorist group had been successfully rehabilitated and 47 former militants had joined the programme [25].

In 2017, the Nigerian government renewed its focus on deradicalization programme it renamed the National Security Corridor to OSC. The OSC is designed as a multi-sector approach comprising of 13 key government agencies which include; Office of the National Security Adviser, Nigerian Police Force, Department of Security Services, the Nigerian Correctional Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, National Emergency Management Agency, National Identity Management Commission, Armed Forces, National Orientation Agency, National Youth Service Corp, National Directorate of Employment and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps. These agencies are incorporated to facilitate the processes of deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegrate defectors [26].

5. Methods of Implementation of the OSC

The countering violent extremism (CVE) programme is locally designed, but benefits from international partnerships especially with state and non-state agencies (ICG, 2021). OSC targets repentant terrorists for deradicalization therapies, vocational training, basic education, and religious re-education for reintegration into the society [27]. Unlike the previous programme, defectors are streamlined into two categories: “high-risk” and “low-risk” defectors [24]. The high-risk defectors are subjected to prosecution while the low-risk defectors are enrolled for rehabilitation and reintegration exercises [24]. The rehabilitation camps for the OSC is according to male and, female and children. The male defectors are stationed in Mallam Sidi Camp, Gombe, Northeast, Nigeria whereas, the Bulumkutu Rehabilitation Center (BRC) in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria is established to cater for women and children. The BRC focus on the deradicalization of women and children in the BH’s former controlled Nigerian territories and BH camps [28]. So far, over 1300 women and children who were affected have undergone the programme [29]. Dissimilar from the male camp, the Bulumkutu Camp is designed for women and children who are camp between 8 and 12 weeks. However, individuals could stay longer especially those with medical problems or unaccompanied children. Within the camp, adults undergo vocational training, while children undergo basic education. Both Women and children are also supported with psycho-social therapies and religious programmes to counter radical narratives. At the end of the exercise, both women
and children are handed to their families or village heads with some amount of money given to them for livelihood [24].

The male deradicalization in Mallam Sidi is somewhat obscure. The author in [24] observes that such vagueness resonates fears, resentments, and inadequate support from local communities. Aside the fuzzy nature of activities, other factors make the deradicalization process in Mallam Sidi Camp a complex process. To lay credence to this argument, in 2016, 147, the Nigerian Military announced that 800 BH fighters surrendered and showed remorse, and would be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society yet not much was heard about the defectors. The International Crisis Group 2021 Report suggest that 96 male defectors in the Mallam Sidi camp have been held for camp for several months while the Nigerian authorities at different times announce the graduation of the defectors before withdrawing their decision. The rescindment of such decisions is influenced by the lack of willingness of the defectors’ home communities and IDP camps to accept the defectors because they see the defectors as threat and the communities appear not to forgive the defectors [8].

At the completion of the programme, the graduates are to be monitored as they are reintegrated into the society. The Nigerian Military collect data of the defectors to avoid the reengagement of defectors to their past. The data collected by the military include; Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) and biometrics. Upon graduation, defectors in Mallam Sidi Camp are paid N20, 000 each [8]. In the area of funding and technical support for the programme, funds and support are mobilised for the operationalisation of the programme and supporting graduates upon completion of the programme. The Federal Government of Nigeria, Borno State government and non-state actors support the programme. The BRC is ran by the Borno State Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and supported by international organisations such as UNICEF and the International Red Cross [8]. By 2019 the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) engaged in supporting graduates of the programme with business tools such retail booths, shoemaker’s shops or hair salons and it is also gearing efforts to set up vocational centres for graduates [8]. The Victims Support Fund (VSF), a Non-governmental Organisation (NGOs) established to support of victims of terrorism since December 2016, have continually intervene in BH affected states to support in the uplifting the livelihood and education of BH displaced victims who are mostly women and children.

6. Factors Influencing OSC

The factors affecting the operationalisation of the OSC include; political, economic, operational legal, community, technological, environmental and security factors. Political environment has some degree of influence. According to Participant Four during KII: “Although, the Nigerian government have shown the political will by the mainstreaming and operationalising of the OSC. However, public perception and the backing of political elites can be instrumental to the reintegartion of combatants into communities”. He noted that the general public were sceptical about having the so call “Repented Terrorist” within their communities. Their fear was that, these elements would end up spying on them and leading the terrorist to attack them. The people within the communities felt it will be difficult for these terrorists to be truly repentant and abandon their ideology. He further noted that the OSC appears to also have lesser degree of acceptance from the political actors and elites. The governor of Borno State, Babagana Zulum also appears to be sceptical about the OSC as
he called for the review of the programme especially as he suggests that some defectors re-join BH as either combatant or informants [30]. This is not the first time an incumbent governor is expressing such view. Senator Ali Ndume, a member of the National Assembly representing Borno South also argue that the programme could be counter-product because the OSC is tantamount to giving BH members amnesty even as they do not deserve [31].

Aside the views of the political elites in Borno State, other senior politicians alleged that repentant BH members are gradually enlisted into the Nigerian military immediately after they complete the programme with some of them giving huge amounts of money without proper monitoring; although, the allegation was refuted by the Nigerian government [32]. Regardless of whether these allegations are true or false, they are capable of creating negative optics which will constrain the needed public support especially in the reintegration stage of the programme. Moreover, such comments from politicians may increase the trust deficit between government and the citizens in terms of the capability of government to address insecurity. The spike in number of atrocities committed across Nigeria has increasingly reduced the citizens faith in government to address the surging violence across Nigeria.

Funding is one of the major issues of the programme. The BH affected communities have been battling with poverty. The unemployment rate of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states and poverty provides openings for the BH recruitment [33]. It can be deduced that the recidivism of former BH combatants is influenced by the absence of a better financial package at the completion of their programme. The programme can become a futile effort especially as BH is reported to be paying and other valuables to individuals for recruitment and public support [34]. Additionally, Material support after exiting the programme appear to be a major challenge as former detainees are not given the sufficient packages at the end of the programme. Upon completion of the programme, detainees in Mallam Sidi receive 20,000 naira, ($60) while the one in BRC collect 5,000 naira, (about $15) foodstuffs, clothes and other essentials [24]. While these packages will give temporal relieve, there is a need to provide package that will sustain the detainees in the long-run.

Operational environment also influences the programme. Internees especially in the Mallam Sidi Camp pass through poor facilities [8]. They are first held in detention centres close to barracks and prepared for screening through the use of threats and force by government security agents and the CJTF [21]. Subsequent on initial detention, the internees stay for longer period up to a year before they are transferred to their various camps. Such kind of problem affects the process of screening detainees as it is difficult to identify a willing BH defector and BH freed BH captive victims. Moreover, operationalisation of OSC is also dependent on peace and stability. Integrating defectors into local communities remain cumbersome because of existing security challenges. BH are active and have some level of influence in which they can recruit individuals through conscription and other forms of material and intangible incentives. We argue that this kind of situation provides fertile ground for recidivism and the misgivings of communities about the effectiveness of the OSC. Social Environment has a great influence on the OSC as some political actors’ express scepticism over the deradicalization process. There are some misgivings about the efficacy of the programme as well as stigmatisation towards the BH victims and defectors. This believe has made reintegration of former combatants and victims into affected communities difficult [35]. Repentant combatants are labelled terrorists and there is public apprehension that former defectors
Will recidivation to violent extremism [36]. Such fear may be motivated by reported cases where repentant BH fighters either return back to BH or become informants [37].

Furthermore, the fear of former combatants has even put the defectors at risk. Some local community members and some members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) (local vigilante group assisting the military in fighting BH) attack them for the atrocities they committed when they were BH members [8]. Of course, this has posed great challenge for individuals exiting the deradicalization camps as many of them overstayed as their communities and families to accept are unwilling to receive them back [24]. Women and children who are victims of BH also suffer stigmatisation and rejection by their families, husbands and the larger community and most of them have been traumatised especially those of them returning with babies conceived in BH camps whose paternity is connected to BH fighters [38].

Technology is central towards the success of OSC. Regardless of the biometrics data of the graduate internees collected, there are challenges in monitoring graduate internees from returning or joining BH. The high number of recidivisms of BH members suggest that the use of technology in terms of biometric data collection and surveillance is weak. Generally, Nigeria has a weak national identification system. However, the country is attempting to strengthen the identification system especially with the introduction the Bank Verification Number (BVN) and the National Identity Number (NIN).

7. Lessons

The Nigerian authorities sees deradicalization as prevention and moderation of radical beliefs as well as disengagement from violence. This is evident in the classification of internees into low-risk (victims) and medium-risk (defectors). However, the men detention at Mallam Sidi Camp contains both low-risk and medium-risk. This could be problematic as different degrees of risk require different interventions. Moreover, separating both classes can assist in avoiding the low-risk egging towards violent extremism. According to Participant One during interview, “the OSC in practice is more of a disengagement than deradicalization, Nigerian security agents main focus is for the internees to abandon violence”. To facilitate the disengagement process, the use of force is also applied by soldiers to prepare and coerce internees for screening towards abandonment of violence. This could be effective temporarily as some defectors could renounce violent extremism in the face of pressure but could relapse when they are reintegrated into the society. This position was also backed by Participant Three who agreed that the use of force in the deradicalization and disengagement process was counterproductive in the long run as the defectors most times find there way back to their colleagues as soon as they are opportune to. The lessons learned from the OSC suggests that strategic environment plays important role in the success of deradicalization programme. The nature of the strategic environment includes political, funding, operational environment, social environment and technological factors and the poor output of these factors towards achieving the aim of the programme. This was further explained by Participant Four during KII. He said for the OSC to be successful, the society or community should be sanitized on the need to accept these repentant terrorists into the society. They should be given the opportunity to become productive members of the society without discrimination or stigmatization. This would encourage more of their comrades to lay down their arms and join the programme. But that as long as the repentant fighters were not well accommodated in the society,
they would always find a way to re-join their former colleagues where they are accepted. This study suggests that positions of political actors affect public perception and the acceptability of deradicalization as such political actors have huge roles to play in success of deradicalization programme. The comments of political actors play huge role in shaping public perception which in turn affects the social environment. According to Participant Five, the influence of social environment on OSC is anchored on family and community rejection as well as stigmatisation of both perpetrators and victims of violent extremism. Harsh environment according to him dissuades defectors and harden other internees at the long-run. This mirrors the common assertion by scholars about the central role of society in the success of deradicalization. Through the OSC, this paper argues that operational environment is important to the human rights of internees and the genuine and gradual deradicalization and disengagement from violence. According to participants one, two and four, the poor operational environment has also affected the funding of the programme especially as it discourages donors from contributing funds. Therefore, they all agreed on the need for deliberate attempt to improve the operational environment. This study also argues that technology is vital to the monitoring and control of deradicalized individuals. In the case of Nigeria, insufficient technology and the exploded population of over 200 million citizens make surveillance of graduate internees difficult. As such, some of them are likely to reengage in violence. This was further collaborated by Participant Three who agreed that the use of Modern technology in tracking and documentation of defectors would go a long way in preventing recidivism.

From the KII carried out, another lesson learnt from the OSC is that exit strategy of graduate internees may impede the efforts and purpose of the programme, this was alluded to by some of the participants who agreed that the way the internees are graduated goes a long way in determining whether they would remain repentant of return back to their old ways. We argue that if graduate internees are not given adequate skills and funds for business and quality livelihood upon completion of the programme, there is the tendency that BH may lure them back through financial and other form of benefits. OSC has both potentials and challenges. When talking about its potentials, some BH defectors are motivated by the existence of the programme this is evident in their defection from BH and willingness to follow the path of peace. This should be a great motivation for the Nigerian authorities to operationalise the programme effectively.

8. Recommendations

In order to ensure the success of the OSC, Nigeria needs to address a number of problems. There is a need to engender proper screening especially between the low-risk and medium-risk. There is danger in putting together those who voluntarily left BH areas and those who were arrested by the security forces. Not screening and separating the two may lead to another form of radicalisation. Nigerian Security needs to utilise indigenes who understand the background and can easily differentiate between the two. The use of force to obtain information from detainees can discourage intending defectors from voluntarily joining the programme. Nigerian authorities should also emplace measures of checking human rights of inductees during and after their transfer to Mallam Sidi. This is important to encourage donor to support the programme and to reassure intending donors of the benefits of joining the OSC. To further boost the confidence of donors and intending defectors, the conditions of detainees’ camp needs to be drastically improved. This will also have a far-reaching effect on graduates of the camp not to re-engage in radicalism. There is also a need for the Nigerian authorities to address the issue of
reintegration. Families and the wide communities of detainees need to be oriented about the dangers of stigmatisation especially to individuals who are victims of BH violence. This will expedite the desire for more defectors to forsake their violent ideology. It will also address the rejection victim internees suffer from their communities and families. To also reduce the rejection of graduates, there is a need for victims of BH to have some sense of justice. The public should have knowledge on the prosecution and incarceration of the high-risk defectors. This will require effective and efficient delivery of justice by the judiciary on cases concerning.

The attack on graduates of the OSC by community members and vigilante groups can scuttle the success of the programme especially as detainees are kept for long. Keeping detainees for long constrains resources and may dissuades new internees from concentrating in the programme. Family and community are key support elements of rehabilitation and reintegration programs [40]. Government needs to emplace reconciliation and forgiveness mechanism to address the issue of rejection of graduates by families and local communities.

There is also the need to boost stakeholder confidence in the programme. Scepticism on the side of the public and political about the futility of OSC and the morality of granting jihadists amnesty and rewards pose a challenge to reintegration process. Rejection of graduates by local communities and families are informed by public opinions and statements from political elites. Therefore, government at all levels need to collaborate and ensure public awareness campaign through a multi-stake holder approach involving non-state actors to highlight the benefits of OSC.

9. Conclusion

The Nigerian deradicalization programme as evident in OSC is a respond to the groundswell criticisms over the excessive use of force in addressing terrorism. The deradicalization programme can be effectual towards making extremists abandon violence and captives of terrorism not to engage in violent extremism.

OSC complements the military approach to ending terrorism especially as BH is somewhat degraded with a number of fighters willing to defect. It gives room for willing defectors to abandon violent extremism. The OSC is also important at the moment. Those at risk of becoming violent extremist are subjected to reorientation and cure from trauma. This is most important for women and children. However, the consequences of a poorly planned and executed deradicalization programme comes with great problems recidivism of defectors and victims of terror, inadequate motivation for willing defectors and, the challenges of reintegrating graduates to their families and communities.

The pitfalls of OSC such as human rights issues, inadequate management, poor exit of graduates and the resultant recidivism of defectors if not managed creates public trust deficit and discouragement of donors to support the programme. The Nigerian authorities needs to demonstrate more effort to gain public support and donor confidence.

Notes

Below is a table showing the description of each participant. The identity of the participants remains
anonymous; however, it is pertinent to describe the participants in order to highlight their relevance to this study.

Table 1

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<td>Participant One</td>
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<td>September, 2021</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Participant Two</td>
<td>Staff of the Nigerian Police Headquarters, Damaturu, Yobe State</td>
<td>September, 2021</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Participant Three</td>
<td>Staff of the Nigerian Army. Maimalari Cantonment. Maiduguri, Borno State.</td>
<td>September, 2021</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Participant Four</td>
<td>Senior Staff, Borno State Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement, Maiduguri, Borno State.</td>
<td>November, 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Participant Five</td>
<td>Staff of the Nigerian Airforce, Nigerian Airforce base, Maiduguri, Borno State.</td>
<td>November, 2021</td>
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</tbody>
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