“Language Phenomena” under the Standard of “Experience”A Reinterpretation of Locke's View on Language

Authors

  • Lizhong Tan School of Humanities and Education, Foshan University, Jiangwan 1st Road, Foshan 528000, China
  • Fuping Xiao Foreign Language School, Xihua University, Pidu, Chengdu 610039, China

Keywords:

Language, Experience, Meaning

Abstract

Within the framework of John Locke's empiricism, language phenomena, as objects of human cognition, are confined to the existence of natural languages. At the level of words, they primarily manifest in the form of "sound," and their meaning construction still follows the dialectical unity of "idea-word." If we reposition language phenomena under the standard of "experience," such language phenomena should then be characterized as part of psychological experience and natural experience, that is, the psychological form of language and the natural form of language. The psychological and natural forms of language phenomena are unified in the process of experience occurrence, stipulated by the rational experiencer, which thereby determines the source of meaning and the form of expression of language phenomena.

References

M. Losonsky. Linguistic Turns in Modern Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. xii.

J. Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University press, 1999, pp. 389-90.

B. Russell. (1903). Principles of Mathematics, [On-line]. pp. 47-8. Available: http://fair-use.org/bertrand-russell/the-principles-of-mathematics [June 17, 2023].

L. Wittgenstein. ???????????????????, 1996, p. 42.

F.P. Xiao. and S.M. Xiao. ??????. ????????, 2015, p. 25.

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Published

2024-04-05

How to Cite

Lizhong Tan, & Fuping Xiao. (2024). “Language Phenomena” under the Standard of “Experience”A Reinterpretation of Locke’s View on Language. International Journal of Social Sciences: Current and Future Research Trends, 21(1), 35–44. Retrieved from https://ijsscfrtjournal.isrra.org/index.php/Social_Science_Journal/article/view/1607

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